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EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND ITS EFFECTS ON
FREE TRADE

NATALIE COLLINS*

I.

INTRODUCTION

1
"A healthy economy is dependant upon a healthy environment."
While this statement does not reflect the conventional wisdom that
assumed that environmental regulations must hurt the economy, becasue
such regulations cost business and industry money, many economists,
politicians, and even heads of industry are beginning to recognize the truth
behind this statement. There are several ways in which environmental
regulations can benefit trade and industry without losing their power to
protect the environment. Economists have long realized on a theoretical
level that environmental regulations that internalize the external costs of
environmental damage benefit the economy not only by ensuring that the
cause of the environmental damage pays the external cost, but also by
encouraging greater industrial efficiency and the development of new2
the regulations.
industry and businesses to meet the demand produced by
However, government and industry have only recently begun to realize
how significant these developments can be to their own economies and
businesses. For example, Europe and Japan began regulating energy
production during the oil scare in the late 1970s in order to encourage
more efficient production. 3 Energy producing industries and industries
that require a great amount of energy have a large advantage if they are
located in these areas, because that efficiency translates to savings in
energy costs. 4 At the same time, these measures benefit the environment
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I Margaret Thatcher, former Prime Minister of Great Britain, in a speech to the Royal
*

Society (September 1998).
2 DAVID W. PEARCE & R. KERRY TURNER, ECONOMICS OF NATURAL RESOURCES AND

THE ENVIRONMENT 71-73 (1990).
3 Margaret Brusasco-MacKenzie,

Case Study: Environmental Legislation of the
European Community, in TRANSNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND ITS IMPACT ON
CORPORATE BEHAVIOR 180 (Eric J. Urbani et al. eds., 1994).
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because greater efficiency in energy production results in less resource
consumption and lower pollution levels.5 As states' economies have
become more and more intertwined, governments and businesses have
begun to realize that differing environmental standards often become nontariff trade barriers, either incidental to a true environmental concern, or
deliberately, as protectionism in a green guise.6 Whether such differences
in environmental standards affect trade directly, such as outright
restrictions on imports, exports, production or consumption, or indirectly
by more subtle means of market access, they still result in a negative
impact upon trade and the economy.7
The European Union ("EU') realized this enviro-economic truth
early in its existence. Although the original Treaty Establishing the
European Economic Community ("EEC Treaty") did not contain any
provisions expressly relating to the environment, member states quickly
began to realize that without a common environmental policy, the goal of
a common economic market could not be met.8 The EU began utilizing
trade provisions in its treaty to eliminate differing member product
standards or restrictions that were environmentally based,, and from there
has proceeded to develop, maintain, and improve an environmental
regulatory system that encourages the EU's original economic purpose, 9
while simultaneously managing to remedy such environmental evils as the
once extreme pollution of the Rhine River.' 0 The EU's environmental
policy has also begun to influence other nations' environmental strategies,
not only by serving as an example of how the co-existence of a stronger
economy and a cleaner environment may be achieved, but also due to the
fact that the EU, with its enhanced environmental influence resulting from
the common position of its member states, has begun negotiating for
5 See UTE COLLIER, ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION

(1994).

6 Martin Coleman, Environmental Barriersto Trade and European Community Law, in
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 131-33 (A.E. Boyle ed., 1994).
7

Id.

8 Alan Butt Philip, The European Union: Environmental Policy and the Prospectsfor
Sustainable Development, in GOVERNANCE AND ENVIRONMENT IN WESTERN EUROPE

253, 256 (Kenneth Hanf & Alf-Inge Janson eds., 1998); Regina S. Axelrod & Norman J.
Vig, The European Union as an Environmental Governance System, in THE GLOBAL
ENVIRONMENT: INSTITUTIONS, LAW AND POLICY 72, 74 (Norman J. Vig & Regina S.

Axelrod eds., 1999).
9See Margaret Brusasco-MacKenzie, European Community Law and
the Environment,
in ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH, supra note 6, at 71; Robert
F. Meagher, EC EnvironmentalLaw, in TRANSNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND ITS
IMPACT ON CORPORATE BEHAVIOR, supra note 3, at 151.

10 Brusasco-MacKenzie, supra note 3, at 176.
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environmental harmonization at a more international level, in order to gain
some part of the free trade advantages derived from environmental
harmonization in an even larger market.
As states become increasingly entangled in more global free trade,
they will be forced to confront the issue of differing environmental
standards, even as they are being forced to deal with environmental
problems that are becoming progressively more imperative. To what
extent should other states attempt to reach the type of international
environmental harmonization present in the EU? This article will attempt
to answer that question by examining the development of the EU's
environmental law and its relation to trade law, taking a more in depth
assessment of the benefits of its system, and contrasting those benefits
with the system's flaws.
II.

THE

DEVELOPMENT

OF

THE

EUROPEAN

UNION'S

ENVIRO-

ECONOMIC SYSTEM

Originally, the member states of the European Union felt little
12
need to place provisions relating to the environment into their treaties.
In fact, the environment was neyer mentioned in a European Union treaty,
except in the context of nuclear radiation, until the entry into force of the
EEC Treaty. 13 Article 36 of the EEC Treaty did permit states to regulate
imports and exports for "the protection of the health and life of humans,
animals, and plants,"'14 enabling states to take some care of their
environment without being in violation of their treaty obligations, but
nowhere did the EEC Treaty specifically instruct the European Union
governing bodies to take any steps regarding the environment. 5 However,
as member states introduced more and more environmental measures that
had an impact upon imports, exports, and fair competition, the members
themselves began to realize that a common market was going to require
common environmental policy,' 6 and in 1972, the member states asked the
EU governing bodies to draft a community environmental policy, resulting
IIId. at 177.
12 Philip, supra note 8, at 256.
13 Brusasco-MacKenzie, supra note 9, at 72.
14 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S.

3 [hereinafter EEC Treaty].
15Id.
16 PAMELA M. BARNES & IAN G. BARNES, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN THE EUROPEAN
UNION 9-10 (1999).
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in the First7 Environmental Action Programme ("First Action
Programme").'
The First Action Programme introduced many of the principles
that guide EU environmental law today. It promulgated the concept of
what is now known as the "precautionary principle," the idea that
environmental damage should be stopped before it starts, if at all
possible.' 8 This led to the idea that environmental considerations should
be integrated into other community decisions that could have an effect on
the environment. 19 The First Action Programme also incorporated the
20
"polluter pays principle" for both preventative and clean-up measures.
As a result of these policies, the EU began issuing a great number of
environmental regulations. 2 1 However, because the EEC Treaty had no
provisions specifically mentioning the environment or the legal
justification for this environmental legislation, it had to be grounded in
22
provisions relating to trade.
The majority of EU legislation on the environment that was passed
after the First Action Programme was justified under two main articles,23
while the European Court of Justice ("ECJ") combined those articles with
yet another article to rule against certain actions or legislation by member
states.24 Article 100 of the EEC Treaty states that "[t]he Council, acting
by means of a unanimous vote on a proposal of the [European]
Commission, shall issue directives for the approximation of such
legislation and administrative provisions of the member states as have a
direct incidence on the establishment of functioning of the Common
Market.", 25 This article does not limit the subject material of these
directives, so long as the directives directly affect the common market.
Therefore, the Council was able to use this article to eliminate differences
in environmental policies among states that were causing obstacles to free

Brusasco-Mackenzie, supra note 9, at 73.
18 First Environmental Action Programme, 1973 O.J. (C 1) 12.
17

19Id.

20 Id.
21 IDA KOPPEN, THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY'S ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: FROM THE
SUMMIT IN PARIS, 1972, TO THE SINGLE EUROPEAN ACT, 1987 (1988).
22 Id.
23
24
25

Brusasco-MacKenzie, supra note 9, at 74-75
Coleman, supra note 6, at 134-35
EEC Treaty, supra note 14, at art. 100.
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intra-Community trade and competition.26 Article 235 further elaborates
upon the Council's power by stating:
If any action by the Community appears necessary to
achieve, in the functioning of the Common Market, one of
the aims of the Community in cases where this Treaty has
not provided for the requisite powers of action, the Council,
acting by means of a unanimous vote on a proposal of the
Commission and after the Assembly27has been consulted,
shall enact the appropriate provisions.
The statement of the Community's objectives is very broad,
including not only "a harmonious development of economic activities,"
but also "raising of the standard of living," 28 so that the Council can
implement a wide range of measures, including environmental measures
under Article 235. While sitting in judgment upon environmental
measures passed by member states, in order to determine whether those
measures are in compliance with their EU obligations, the ECJ based
many of its decisions upon its interpretation of Article 30, which states
that qualitative restrictions on imports and all measures having equivalent
effect are prohibited between member states. 29 In one case, the ECJ
defined "measures having an equivalent effect" as "all trading rules
enacted by member states which are capable of hindering directly or
indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-Community trade,, 30 which
obviously includes such measures as import/export restrictions based on
environmental grounds.
However, the ECJ has permitted certain
restrictions meant to satisfy other mandatory member obligations, so long
as they are "necessary in order to satisfy [those] mandatory
requirements," 31 and later identified the environment as one of these
mandatory obligations. 32 For a further discussion of this balancing act
between legitimate versus protectionist environmental measures, see
Section IV of this Note.
Brusasco-MacKenzie, supra note 9, at 74.
EEC Treaty, supra note 14, at art. 235.
28
Id.at art. 2.
29
Id.at art. 30.
30 Case 8/74, Procureur du Roi v. Dassonville, 1974 E.C.R. 837, 852.
31 Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung fur Branntwein, 1979
E.C.R. 649, 662.
32 Case 240/83, Procureur de ]a Republique v. Association de Defense des Bruleurs
26
27

d'Huiles Usagees, 1985 E.C.R. 531.
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Due to the importance attained by environmental during these
years of implementing the common market, the next major EU treaty
reflected the interconnectedness of the environment to inter-member trade
by not only mentioning it, but by creating its own title.3 3 The Single
European Act ("SEA") contained several provisions that specifically
mentioned ways in which the EU was empowered to deal with the
common environment. Article 100a says that there should be "a high level
of protection" in the fields "concerning health, safety, environmental
protection and consumer protection" in any proposals by the [European]
Commission for approximations of provisions laid down for the
continuing establishment and functioning of the common market. 34 This
clearly states the intention that a common environmental policy should not
turn into a common lowest denominator policy. Furthermore, it provides
that although member states may adopt national measures in seeming noncompliance with 100a harmonizing measures due to the need set out in
Article 36, or relating to the working environment, those national
measures must first be verified to the European Commission
("Commission") to ensure "that they are not a means of arbitrary
discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between Member
3
States.
Article 130r lists objectives for those Community measures that
are actually intended to affect the environment; they must "preserve,
protect and improve the quality of the environment . . . [and] ensure a
prudent and rational utilization of natural resources. ' ' 36 It goes on to
embody the principles upon which Community action should be based:
that preventative action should be taken; that environmental damage
37
should be rectified at the source; "and that the polluter should pay."
However, economic needs of the common market are not ignored in this
article. Community environmental decision-making processes must not
only consider environmental conditions, based on the available scientific
and technical data and the potential costs and benefits of both action and
inaction, but must also consider the "economic and social development of
the Community as a whole and the balanced development of its regions. ,,38
33EUROPEAN COMM'N, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE ENVIRONMENT
7-8

(1997);
Single European Act, February 17-18, 1986, 25 I.L.M. 506, 515 [hereinafter SEA].
34 SEA, supra note 33, at
512.

see

Id.

36 Id. at 515 (requiring Community actions to also "contribute toward protecting human
health").
37
Id.
38 1id
.
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However, the SEA does allow member states to have environmental
regulations that are stricter than the environmental measures taken by the
Community under Article 130r, thereby making especially sure that
community measures do not result in a lowest common denominator
environmental regulatory scheme. The SEA states that those stricter
measures may not be incompatible with the other goals of the treaty, such
as free movement of goods and fair competition, thus maintaining the
balance between the environment and trade. 39
Further developments occurred in the 1990s, beginning with the
Treaty on European Union ("Maastricht Treaty"). 40 The Maastricht Treaty
amended Article 2 of the EEC Treaty to add to the main objectives of the
EU not only the "harmonious and balanced development of economic
activities . . . [and] a high degree of convergence of economic
performance," but also "sustainable and non-inflationary growth
respecting the environment." 41 Even more important additions were made
to the environmental title created by the SEA. Article 130r was amended
to allow the EU to take a role in promoting broader international
harmonization of environmental measures.42 Perhaps more importantly,
Article 130s was amended to enable environmental (and other) measures
to be passed by a qualified majority of the Council, excepting primarily
fiscal provisions, provisions relating to many local land use planning
issues, and the energy structure of member states, in contrast to the
previous requirement that environmental measures be passed
unanimously.h In order to prevent fears that this would overreach state
sovereignty and undo any provisions that protect against the downgrading
of environmental policy to the lowest standard, Article 3 was amended to
include and emphasize the importance of the subsidiarity principle, which
requires the EU to only take actions in those areas that are particularly
suited to resolution at a Community level, and leave those matters that
may appropriately be determined at a more local level to the states. 44 The
EU continued its strong stance on the importance of a common
environmental policy in its most recent modification to the Treaty of
Amsterdam, which added a provision requiring that environmental
39 See id. at 516.
40 Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 253 [hereinafter Maastricht
Treaty].
41

Id. at 256-57.

42

Id. at 285.

43Id.at 286.
44Id.at 257-58.

See SEA, supra note 33, at 8.
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protection must be integrated into the definition and implementation of all
Community policies and activities.45
III.

POSITIVE EFFECTS OF THE EU's INCREASING ENVIRONMENTAL
INVOLVEMENT

Having examined the development of EU environmental law and
having noted its genesis in the realization that environmental regulations
of member states often created non-tariff trade boundaries, it must now be
determined whether the EU's environmental policy has actually had the
desired effect upon the EU's trade and industry, or whether the common
environmental system has cost trade and industry money without
producing any reciprocal benefits.
The following questions will be addressed: Do common standards
actually have an appreciable impact on the free flow of goods and the fair
competition of all member industries? Do environmental standards
Can
invariably end up costing industry money in the long run?
environmental regulation benefit the common market economy in other
ways?
A.

Benefits to Free Trade and Competition in General

Environmental regulations can interfere with the running of the
common market.46 Restrictions that appear to be based on environmental
or product quality standards can easily be twisted to restrict foreign
imports or to tilt the industrial or marketing playing field.4 7 The ECJ
recognized this fact and stated that the EU can modify and harmonize any
standards that are being used in such a way. 48 How does this forcible
harmonization work in practice without overbalancing in favor of either
the environment or trade?
One example of such a successful balancing act is the Danish
Bottles case.49 In order to better protect its environment, Denmark
45 Treaty of Amsterdam, Oct. 2, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 56,
81.
46

See generally Damian Chalmers, Inhabitants in the Field of European Community

Environmental Law, 5 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 39 (1998) (discussing environmental
regulations effect on the market).
4 Phillipe Sands, European Community Environmental Law: The Evolution of a
Regional Regime of International Environmental Protection, 100 YALE L.J. 2511, 2513
1991).
8 See Case 91/79, Commission v. Italy, 1980 E.C.R. 1099.
49 Case 302/86, Commission v. Denmark, 1988 E.C.R. 4607.
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decided that all soda and beer containers must have a very strict recycling
scheme. Oddly enough, Denmark did not consider it necessary to subject
the containers of items such as milk and wine, which have few problems
from import competition, to the same strict scheme.50 The scheme
required a mandatory deposit and return system for all such containers,
and, to ensure as high a rate of return as possible, the containers of the
products had to be approved by Denmark's National Agency for the
Protection of the Environment ("NAPE"), in order to make it possible that
all such containers could be returned to any store that sold such beverages.
NAPE limited their approval to approximately thirty types of containers at
one time to make sure that the system was workable-a requirement that
prevented many non-Danish companies from acquiring access to the
Danish market. 1 Despite protest from the Commission, NAPE eventually
allowed sales of non-approved products when the producers supplied their
own deposit and return -system, but only in limited quantities, claiming
that because such containers could only be returned to the stores that sold
the non-approved product, there would be a much lower rate of return for
those containers, and therefore they could not allow many of them to be
sold. 2
The Court found that although a mandatory deposit and return
scheme was not incompatible with EU trade obligations, which allow truly
environmental regulation and restriction to a certain, equally applied
extent, the limitation on the sales of the independent deposit and return
system beverages violated free trade because it was both discriminatory
and disproportionate to the supposed objective. In other words, the ECJ
felt that the independent deposit and return systems would work
sufficiently well to protect the environment and meet both Community and
Danish environmental goals, but that the extra limitations in quantity
imposed by Denmark on independently recycled products went beyond the
stated environmental purpose and created nothing more than a trade
barrier, and then instructed Denmark to remove the quantitative limit. 53
Insistence upon the elimination of measures that are only
masquerading under the guise of environmental regulation does not just
apply to governmental measures. For example, when a Dutch association
of chemical storage companies decided to collectively set a fixed
"environmental charge" that had to be paid by all
customers, the
50

Id. at 4612.

51Id.
52

Id.

53Id. at 4642-44.
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Commission objected to this agreement on two related grounds. Not only
did such a collective agreement breach Article 85 by giving consumers no
chance to shop around and encourage economic competition, but it also
violated the environmental objectives of the Community, because by
preventing competition, the agreement also eliminated the drive for more
efficient and environmentally sound means of storing chemicals. Under
pressure from the Commission, the association agreed to eliminate the
fixed charge.54
The above examples demonstrate some of the ways in which the
EU manages to deal with those national environmental standards that are
actually not environmentally based at all, without appreciably lowering the
true environmental standard of the state in question. This still leaves open
the question of whether EU interference in true environmental standards
and systems actually brings the same sorts of trade benefits to its members
while still refraining from appreciably lowering those standards. One
example of such an attempt involves Germany's "Green Point" plan and
the EU's subsequent entry into the field of regulating waste packaging.
Several years ago, Germany passed laws requiring all
manufacturers selling goods in Germany to recycle packaging in which
goods are transported and sold. This requirement applied equally to native
and foreign manufacturers, and in all appearances was a genuine
environmental attempt to reduce waste. As a result of this ordinance,
many German companies united and formed a system for the retrieval of
packaging waste from retailers and homes, called the Duales System
Deutschland ("DSD"). The selling of "green spots" to each participating
company funds this program. For each package that a participating
country enters into the DSD system, the company pays a certain amount of
money and promises that the packages waste will be recycled according to
DSD standards, once DSD returns the packaging waste. In return, DSD
places a "green spot" upon the package, which assures retailers and
homeowners that DSD will be retrieving the waste, and promises
consumers that the company involved has promised to recycle the waste in
a DSD-approved manner. The German government was so thrilled with
the DSD system that it agreed to subsidize the system."
The DSD system worked very well in achieving its intended aim.
Unfortunately, it created a few problems in other areas. As time
progressed, the DSD system had a large negative impact upon the free
flow of goods from member states into Germany. Even if foreign retailers
54 Coleman,
55BARNES

supra note 6, at 165.
& BARNES, supra note 16, at 167.
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who were not members of the DSD scheme were willing to do their own
retrieval and recycling, retailers would often refuse to stock the items
anyway, because it would. be more difficult to deal with those packaging
wastes than DSD packaging wastes. Consumers would often refuse to buy
products without the "green spot" seal of environmental approval.
Foreign companies often had a difficult time becoming a member of DSD
due to differences regarding what is considered to be acceptable recyclable
materials and methods between countries. For example, some countries
accept the use of heat from incineration as a form of recycling, but
56
Germany does not.
As the success of DSD grew, other problems appeared. DSD
became so successful that it eventually began recovering more waste
packaging than there was capacity to recycle it in Germany, so the waste
began to be shipped to recycling facilities in other countries. This outward
shipment of waste grew and grew until finally, instead of being able to sell
the waste to recycling companies, they had to pay the recycling companies
to take it. Not only did this get quite expensive, but it also knocked the
bottom out of the waste market in the EU as a whole, and Britain and
France began complaining that Germany was "environmentally dumping,"
by making it fiscally impossible for other countries to have their waste
recycled.5 As a result of this upheaval, the EU stepped in to harmonize
national waste recovery programs with Directive 92/62/EEC.
This directive required all members to establish return and
management systems that comply with certain EU guidelines as to what
are considered to be recyclable materials and methods, including reuse,
organic recycling and incineration for the production of heat, just as all
packaging placed on the common market must abide by certain common
guidelines.
Furthermore, all packaging across the common market had
to be marked to demonstrate the degree to which it has recyclable. The
goal of the directive was to achieve a 50% minimum/65% maximum
recovery rate, a 25% minimum/45% maximum recycling rate and a 15%
minimum rate for recycling of each category of material by July 2001.59
Member states could recover and recycle more than the maximum rate if
they choose, but only if they are capable of handling the excess waste
within their own countries. 60 Although the road to implementation has
56

Coleman, supra note 6, at 158.

57Id.

58 BARNES & BARNES, supra note 16, at 168.

Id.
60 Id.

196
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been a somewhat bumpy one involving the issuance of more than one
Reasoned Opinion to try and bring member states into compliance, the
situation appears to have stabilized.
Changing the World by Changing the Market:
Loss Is Another's Gain

B.

One Industry's

The above section has dealt with the ways in which EU
environmental policies tend to benefit trade and industry as a whole.
Nevertheless, not every environmental measure benefits every industry.
This fact may be balanced by the fact that these environmental policies
create entirely new markets and opportunities to be taken advantage of by
other industries. 62 For example, the environmental industry itself is said to
be valued at over $250 billion worldwide.63 Furthermore, the EU makes
use of environmental measures that can be used by existing industries to
gain a competitive edge in the new common market. 64 The following
section will attempt to explain ways in which trade and industry gain in
one sector what they lose in another sector due to EU environmentalism,
to end up with an overall balance.
In 1993, the Commission produced a "White Paper" dealing with
topics related to industry growth and employment, prompted by a rise in
unemployment in the EU due to recession conditions. The Commission
did not find that these conditions were caused by increased environmental
regulation (among other things). Instead, it found that the recession was a
result of continued inefficient overuse of natural and environmental
resources, combined with insufficient use of the trained workforce. 66 The
Commission felt that this trend could be reversed by increased investment
in high-tech, research and development industries, increased
implementation of clean (and therefore more efficient and less costly in
the long run) technology, and greater development of the infrastructure-61

Id.

62 Join Pedersen, Sustainable Development and the European Jobs Market, in THE
ENVIRONMENT, EMPLOYMENT AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 83

(Monica Hale &

Mike Lachowicz eds., 1998).
63 BARNES & BARNES, supra note 16, at 152.
64 Samuel L. Lind, Eco-Labels and International Trade Law: Avoiding Trade Violations
While Regulating the Environment, 8 INT'L LEGAL PERSP. 113 (1996).
65 Growth, Competitiveness, and Employment: The Challenges and Ways Forward Into

the 21st Century, White Paper, COM(93)700 final [hereinafter Growth, Competitiveness,
and
Employment].
66
1d. at ch. 2.
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all methods that are compatible with, and even encouraged by,
environmental regulation and concern. 67 For example, improving the
infrastructure causes jobs, both in its construction and maintenance. A
better infrastructure makes it more efficient-and therefore less
expensive-for industries to transport raw materials and finished products,
not only giving them a competitive edge, but also freeing some of their
resources for investment in growing high-tech fields.
The EU's
environmental policy also encourages the improvement of its members'
infrastructure, in order to decrease noise pollution and carbon dioxide
emissions.68 This assessment was confirmed by the EU Economic and
Social Committee, which agreed that the problems were based upon a
deficiency in:
[a] number of aspects ... namely: the quality of education
and training, the efficiency of industrial organization, the
ability to bring about constant improvement in the
production process, the dynamism of research and
development and its industrial application, the availability
of competitive infrastructures and services, product quality
and the readiness to take account in business strategy of the
consequences of social changes (e.g., the field of
environmental protection).69
If any further doubts remain as to the Commission's assessment
that environmental regulation provides opportunities for industrial growth,
one need only look at research on the ability of environmental regulation
to provide employment, an inevitable symptom of a growing area of
industry. In 1997, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development ("Organization") published a report on the effects of
environmental regulation and employment, and in the report it reached
three conclusions. 70 The Organization found: (1) that there was a direct
correlation between environmental policy and employment; (2) that this
correlation is positive, despite the complaints of some industries to the
contrary; and (3) that it is therefore possible for environmental,

67 Id.
68
69

70

SEA, supra note 33, at 10-11.
Growth, Competitiveness, and Employment, supra note 65, at 48.
ORG.

FOR

ECON.

EMPLOYMENT 100

COOPERATION

(1997).

AND

DEV.,
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employment, and growth. concerns to coexist. 71 There is a long list of
industries and types of employment created by environmental regulation
in Europe, both on the regulation and enforcement side, as well as the
industry and compliance side. 72 Indeed, the statistics are surprising. An
estimate of EU jobs directly supported by environmental expenditure in
1992 was reportedly at 1.2 million (1.3% of EU employment), a number
expected to nearly double by the year 2000.7 3 It is estimated that there
were at least another 200,000 individuals employed in conservation jobs,
such as park managers and heritage preservationists, and another 500,000
in "environmental management."
The Commission suspects that the
inclusion of jobs that were merely "environmentally related" would nearly
double that number. 75 Many jobs created in this way are located in areas
that need an economic boost to get caught up with the rest of the EU. For
example, the contaminated land remediation market was expected to reach
four billion ECU in 2000.76 Not only is this an industry that requires a lot
of labor, but it is also frequently located, or at least carried out, in regions
77
suffering from economic depression due to industrial decline.
In the EU, environmental regulation does not only help promote
the overall growth of industry by providing economic opportunities in and
of itself, it also helps certain industries gain an edge over other industries.
Two of the primary ways in which the EU grants this environmental edge
involve environmental audits and environmental labels. As early as 1990,
the Community Environmental Ministers "acknowledged the value of
supplementing existing regulatory instruments... by the use of economic
and fiscal instruments."78 Although this understanding was prompted in
part by the development of similar procedures on a national level, which
gave rise to concern that national practices such as eco-labeling were
7IId.
72 James Medhurst, The Impact of EC Environmental Programmes and Legislation on
Employment, in THE ENVIRONMENT, EMPLOYMENT AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT,

supranote 62, at 49-50.
73 Monica Hale, Expansion and Professionalisation of the European
Environmental
Employment Sector, in THE ENVIRONMENT, EMPLOYMENT AND SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT,
supra note 62, at 62, 69-71.
74
Id. at 71.
75 Id.
76 Medhurst, supra note 72, at 57.
77 Id. at 56-57.
78 Report of the Working Group of Experts from the Member States on the Use of
Economic and FiscalInstruments in EC Environmental Policy, 14 B.C. INT'L & COMP.
L. REV. 447, 448 (1991).
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particularly liable to abuse as a mechanism of import restriction and unfair
competition, it was also caused by the realization that it would be better to
lead the horse of industry to environmentally regulated water than to force
it to drink. 7 9 Eco-auditing and eco-labeling seek-to take advantage of the
fact that an estimated sixty seven percent of EU citizens wish to take
environmental concerns into consideration when they shop, and use this
potential market advantage to bribe business and industry into being
80
environmental on their own account.
The concept of an eco-audit has been in place for over two decades
and businesses have used them on an as-needed basis to determine
compliance with increasing numbers of environmental regulations and to
look for ways to save money. 8' Once member states realized that this
tendency could be used to influence industry to monitor their own
environmental compliance more closely, national eco-audit schemes
became more common. 82 Due to concern that differing schemes would
enable disguised domestic product bias, the EU decided to develop its own
program and invited input of industry as well as policymakers. 83 The
resulting regulation targeted certain industrial groups, leaving open the
possibility that other groups could be added later. 84 The regulation
provided that participation in EU's Environmental Management and Audit
Scheme ("EMAS") would be entirely voluntary, that industries would set
certain environmental goals for themselves, that industries would have an
eco-audit at least every three years to keep track of progress towards those
goals, and that the results of the audits would be published and
independently verified.85 Member states were responsible for ensuring
that there were independent agencies in place to accredit the companies
that verified EMAS audits by 1995.86 The provision relating to the
independent verification was not entirely popular. Member states delayed
putting the requisite agencies in place until the Commission finally
decided to sue Portugal in the ECJ, and businesses expressed concern that
79 David Vogel, EU EnvironmentalPolicy and the GA TTIWTO, in GLOBAL
COMPETITION
AND EU ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 142, 149-51 (Jonathan Golub ed., 1998).
80 Id. at 149.
81 BARNES & BARNES, supra note 16, at 190.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Council Regulation 1836/93 of 29 June 1993 Allowing Voluntary Participation by
Companies in the Industrial Sector in a Community Eco-management and Audit Scheme,
1993 O.J. (L 168) 1, 2-13.
86
Id.
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this would result in valuable corporate information being made public. 87
Despite these hurdles, approximately 900 businesses in the target
industries qualified for EMAS by 1997,88 demonstrating the interest of
industry in this kind of procedure.
Eco-labeling works in a similar way. After a proliferation of
national eco-labeling schemes prompted by Germany's "Blue-Angel"
program, the EU began to develop its own eco-labeling system to
encourage a common standard and discourage discrimination.89 The
resulting regulation provided for a voluntary system in which businesses
that could demonstrate that the product in question had a reduced
environmental impact throughout its entire life-cycle (from creation to
recycling) would receive an eco-label that would inform consumers of the
product's heightened environmental quality.90 The EU and member states
91
decide upon standards for meeting the criteria for each type of product.
Unfortunately, implementation of this program has been slow, due in large
part to the joint and in-depth nature of the determination of the standards.
Nevertheless, several industries have expressed a great deal of interest in
this concept, proving that its use as an environmental "carrot" could
become important. 92 Interestingly enough, the eco-label is theoretically
available to non-EU products, and the demand for this label internationally
has caused the EU some problems, as this Note will discuss below in
Section IV.
Having established that the environment can protect trade while it
creates business opportunities and advantages, it is time to take a hard
look at the assumption that even those environmental measures that seem
to be entirely environmentally-oriented invariably end up costing industry
money in the long run. This hypothesis is far from being as universal as
one might believe, and an example of the potential falsity of this statement
may be seen in the proposed energy tax.
The concept of an EU energy tax first arose in the early 1990s
when the EU began advocating an attempt to reduce and maintain carbon
dioxide emissions by the year 2010, and the debate has remained

& BARNES, supra note 16, at 191.
SEA, supra note 33, at 16.
89 Vogel, supra note 79, at 150.
90 Council Regulation 880/92 on a Community Eco-label Award Scheme,
1992 O.J. (L
99) 1, 2.
87 BARNES
88

91

Id.

92

Vogel, supra note 79, at 150-52.
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acrimonious ever since. 93 Certain facts are being lost amidst the wails of
the high-energy consumption industry. To begin with, carbon dioxide
emissions are expected to be reduced by ten percent by 2010 through the
use of currently available technology, such as more efficient road
transport, an improved infrastructure, more severe regulation of thermal
insulation in buildings, and more efficient electrical appliances, which the
EU expects to increase as a result of the tax, but will result in less actual
tax money being paid.94 The actual increase in energy cost to industry
under either of the two tax methods proposed would only range from six
to thirteen percent, an increase roughly equivalent to the increase in cost to
the homeowner. 95 Industry is ignoring the probable effects of the two
main methods proposed for spending the revenue raised by the energy tax.
One of the proposals involves putting that money towards employee social
96
security contributions and thereby reducing an employer's contribution.
The other proposal suggests using the revenue to support a readjustment in
market interest rates to encourage the flow of capital to industry. 97 In
either proposal, industry will regain most of its lost income. While that
income will be redirected towards non-environmentally harmful areas,
coming in through the back door, the front-end energy tax encourages
more efficient use of the resources that produce CO 2 emissions.98
IV.

FLAWS IN THE EU ENVIRO-ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP

Despite all of the foregoing evidence that the EU does a better job
than most international arrangements at managing to simultaneously
protect trade and the environment, it is unfortunately not a Panglossian
system. While environmental objectives can complement economic
objectives in a surprising number of ways, the integration of
environmental policy into the EU economic system is still essentially a
balancing act, and it encompasses several of the problems that inevitably
surface in any balancing attempt. In trying to find the perfect combination
of environmental and economic policies, how does the EU ensure that one
area is not over-emphasized to the detriment of the other? Similarly, in
93

COLLIER, supra note 5, at 98-99.
94DOMINIQUE GUSBIN ET AL., ECONOMIC EVALUATION OF COMMUNITY OPTIONS
TO
LIMIT CO 2 EMISSIONS AT THE HORIzON 2005 & 2010: FINAL REPORT 3-4 (1997).
95 Id. at 19-20.

961Id. at 15.
97Id. at

98 Id.
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producing a common environmental policy to complement its common
market, how does the EU ensure that the common environmental standard
actually manages to increase environmental protection, rather, than
decrease it to the lowest common denominator?
Besides the problems inherent in almost any system that tries to
simultaneously achieve multiple related objectives, the EU environmental
system has a few specific potential problems that need to be addressed.
There are three primary areas that still require substantial attention before
the EU's environmental system can reach its full potential for the purposes
of assisting trade or protecting the environment. Those areas are
implementation, expansion, and prevention of the emergence of non-tariff
trade barriers in the broader international arena. Each of these areas
presents unique difficulties due to the fact that the EU is a -growing
amalgamation of separate and independent states, with each state
maintaining its own legal and governance system and its own ways of
interacting with other states.
Initially, several environmentalists were concerned that the EU
environmental policy would be hampered because of its conception as a
policy that would benefit trade, fearing that on the occasions when trade
and the environment did actually conflict, the environment would be the
inevitable loser. After all, EU environmental measures frequently get the
necessary support from member states through bargaining, and many of
the bargaining chips are not primarily environmental. 99. Moreover, the EU
frequently consults with industry and trade groups in its environmental
policies, believing that environmental change can be effectuated more
easily and efficiently with industry cooperation.' 00 Directorate-General XI
("DG XI," the environmental directorate) is greatly influenced in its
operations by the other directorates.' 0 ' In theory, DG XI should influence
other directorates, especially since environmental protection is now
required to be integrated into all other policies. However, DG XI is both
newer and smaller than many of the other directorates-a fact that tends to
02
make influence unequal.1
Despite these indications that environmental policy in the EU
might sink to the bottom of the scale when it comes time to weigh all of
the EUs trade-related policies, the result in recent years tends to be quite
Michael Strubel, Environmental Policy in Europe: The Greening of Europe?,
in
235, 240-41
Paul Michael Lutzeler ed., 1994).
Axelrod & Vig, supra note 8, at 77.
101 Id.
102 Id.

99
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the opposite. The Single European Act ("SEA") expressed the principle
that the level of environmental protection must be high,'0 3 and that
environmental protection must be a part of every EU policy. 04 In
addition, it allowed member states to have environmental standards that
were stricter than those required, so long as the standards complied with
EU obligations. 05 Since the SEA, the European Court has stated
consistently that when a member state's provision seems to involve
conflict between free trade and environmental protection obligations,
priority must be given to the goal of environmental protection. 10 6 This
principle has become so engrained that recent cases have given rise to
fears that environmental policy may be separating itself from free trade
and overtaking it as a goal of importance.
One case that gave rise to such concerns is the Walloon Waste
Import Ban Case.' 0 7 In this case, a region of Belgium passed a law
banning the storage, tipping, or dumping of waste from either a foreign
state or another region of Belgium. 08 The Commission felt that this
violated Article 30 of the EEC Treaty, and that the means used (the
outright prohibition on foreign waste) could be more narrowly tailored to
reach the region's health and safety goals, and was therefore too
discriminatory to claim an environmental exception to that Article.'0 9
This was not the first time that the Commission believed that Belgian
regions were failing to comply with various EU obligations in matters
involving waste, and the Court had agreed with the Commission in
previous cases." 0 However, the Court said that the discrimination against
other EU members was justified given the health and environmental risks
involved, especially considering the policy preference expressed in Article
130r for eliminating environmental problems at their source."' Does this
mean that the Court has loosened its requirement from the Danish Bottles
case that environmental measures must be narrowly tailored so as to avoid
conflict with other obligations?" 12
13

SEA, supra note 33, at art. 100a.

104 Id. at art. 130r.

105 Id.

106 Strubel, supra note 99, at 238.
107 Case 2/90, Commission v. Belgium, 1992 E.C.R. 1-4431.
108 Id. at 4433, art. 1.
109 Id. at 4436-37.
110 See, e.g., Case 68/81, Commission v. Belgium, 1982 E.C.R 153.
III Case 2/90, 1992 E.C.R, at 1-4431
112 See Case 302/86, 1988 E.C.R. 4607; see also supra text accompanying note 49.
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Although the Walloon Waste case seems to lead to this conclusion,
there are some unique circumstances about this case that indicate that it
should not be interpreted as broadly as the Court's stance might seem to
indicate. The region of Walloon passed this ordinance in response to the
contamination of a town in Walloon by foreign toxic waste, and there was
a great deal of public sympathy for the Walloon provision." 3 The Court
stated in its analysis that Walloon was affected by the unique nature of
waste, because the EU and its member states had to comply with the Basel
Convention on Dangerous Wastes, which requires self-sufficiency and
proximity to origin in the matter of dealing with wastes. 114 The Court had
already been forced to send the regional provision back to the drawing
board, due to its failure to comply with the EU directive on the
transboundary shipment of hazardous waste, making discussion of the
provision's possible violation of Article 30 somewhat less relevant." 5 For
all of these reasons, it is likely that the Walloon Waste case is a narrow,
fact-specific case, rather than a judicial revision of the Court's longstanding doctrine as stated in the Danish Bottles case.
l l6
Diego Cali & FigliSrl v. Servizi Ecologici Porto di Genova SpA
is another case that may be a cause for possible concern for those who fear
that the concept of environmental protection may be divorcing itself from
its connection to trade. In Diego Cali, the administrative body of Genoa,
Italy turned over the administration of its port's environmental quality to a
private company, SEPG. SEPG proceeded to charge ships that made use
of the Genoese port a fee for pollution surveillance, to help cover the costs
of preventative steps for environmental protection." 17 Diego Cali claimed
that SEPG, a private environmental company that operated for profit, was
abusing its dominant market position by charging these fees; that is, Diego
Cali accused SEPG of violating Article 86 of the EEC Treaty.
However, Article 86 only applies to private, commercial activities. It does
113
114

Coleman, supra note 6, at 151-152.
Case C-2/90, 1992 E.C.R at 1-4431; United Nations Environment Programme

Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Global Convention on the Control of
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes: Final Act and Text of the Basel
Convention, 28 I.L.M. 649 (1989).
115 Case C-2/90, 1992 E.C.R. at 1-4476-77. The court found that the provision
violated
Directive 84/361 on the Supervision and Control within the European Community of the
Transfrontier Shipment of Hazardous Wastes.
116 Case C-343/95, Diego Cali & Figli Srl v. Servizi Ecologici Porto di Genova SpA
SEPG), 1997 E.C.R. 1-1547.
17 Id. at 1-1552.
118 EEC Treaty, supra note 14, at art. 86.
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not apply to governmental actions for the common good. 19 The Court
found that when a government uses a private company to carry out more
efficiently one of its goals towards the public interest, such as
environmental protection, the private company is for those purposes
merely an arm of the government, and Article 86 does not apply to the
services the company performs for the public good at the government's
20
behest.'
In many ways this is an admirable decision. By basing its
determination of competition violations on the function rather than the
form of the activity, the Court encourages governments to find the most
efficient method of providing environmental protection in line with its EU
obligations, even if that method may be through a private company,
without losing the ability to internalize previously external environmental
costs.
However, it does present a couple of potential problems. The
environmental industry has surpassed a value of $250 billion a year in the
world market, and this number will undoubtedly continue to grow
larger. 1 2 Even as this growing market proves that environmental
protection can have a positive impact on trade, it also provides
governments with an ever more valuable incentive to confer advantages,
competitive or otherwise, upon national companies at the expense of
foreign or multi-national companies, a concern that the Court failed to
address in Diego Cali. The Court specifically refused to consider whether
a tonnage based charge applies to all ships entering the port, regardless of
preventative services actually provided, the cargo's ability to pollute, or
the presence of pollution surveillance devices on a particular ship, saying
that the determination that the activity was actually a government activity
made that decision unnecessary. 23 The narrow tailoring of environmental
provisions that could result in trade discrimination, as required by the
Danish Bottles case, would seem to come into play here and require the
Court to rule on this matter as well. In factually similar situations, the
Commission has determined that such fixed "environmental charges by a
company, even with the cooperation of the government, are not only a
possible violation of Article 85, but also a violation of EU environmental
119 Id. at arts. 86 & 90.
120 Case C-343/95, 1997 E.C.R. at 1-1586-76.

Christine Juliet Sohar, The European Union's Legal Integration: A Case Study
of
Living up to the Denver Summit of Eight, 27 DENV. J.INT'L L. & POL'Y 685, 686-88
121

1999).
22 BARNES & BARNES, supra note 16, at 152.
123 Case C-343/95, 1997 E.C.R. at 1-1547.
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obligations, since this fixed charge eliminates the incentive to develop
more efficient and effectual methods of environmental protection.' 24
Despite these recent indications of a potential future problems, the
EU seems to have managed to maintain the tightrope of trade and the
environment fairly well. This balance will not be meaningful if the
process results in the lowering of environmental standards to the least
common denominator among member states. Generally speaking, the
EU's goal is to bring all states up to the level of one of its most
progressive states, but there are several difficulties involved in that
process. 125 Environmental standards have to be passed either unanimously
or, in some instances, by a qualified majority, in theory enabling a
blockade of high standards by those member states that fear that high
environmental standards will prevent them from catching up to the more
industrially advanced members of the EU.' 26 Notwithstanding the
existence of a certain amount of compromise, high standards continue to
be passed despite this difficulty.127 This may be partly due to the fact that
when compromise is necessary, member states can be very ingenious at
finding a method of compromise that does not result in an overall lowering
of the standard of environmental quality in the EU.
For example, during negotiations for the reduction of the carbon
dioxide emission standards, member states that were already meeting or
exceeding the proposed standard agreed to limit their emissions above and
beyond the proposed limit to enable less industrially developed states to
have extra time to develop and invest in emission reducing ability.' 28 The
eventual standard remained high and each member state was bound to
increase its own current standard. 129 When member states attempt to make
use of Article 100a to derogate from an obligation that they do not agree
with, the Court insisted that the Commission must have a very good
reason for permitting an actual derogation from the standard. 30
There are many treaty provisions that guard against any downward
spiral in the EU environmental standard. Article 130r says that the EU

124 Coleman, supra note 6; see also supra text accompanying
note 54.
125

SEA, supra note 33, at 77.
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must "improve the quality of its environment."' 131 Article 130t states that
EU measures "do not prevent any member state from maintaining or
introducing more stringent protective measures, provided these are
compatible with the treaty"' 2-provisions that were maintained and
strengthened by further treaties. All of these precautions help to insure
that the standards set by the EU continue to set a high level of
environmental protection.
Even if the EU manages to maintain the necessary environmental
balance and level on paper, this does not necessarily mean that its
problems are over. Although the EU is a governing body, the subsidiarity
principle and practicality require that much of the implementation of EU
standards be left in the hands of member state governments, where there is
a great deal of potential for apathy or outright abuse in the interests of
trade discrimination.133 The EU only allocates one percent of its budget to
the environment, as compared to other categories such as agriculture,
which receives sixty percent of the budget, although certain portions of
those other areas may be environmental to a lesser degree.' 34 Similarly,
the departments of ecology, nuclear safety, and consumer protection
combined have only 300 employees, compared to the 2,000 employees in
agricultural policy. 35 The European Environment Agency ("EEA") is not

the enforcement equivalent of the American Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA"); it merely exists to collect and organize environmental
data for the EU to use in policy, the states to use in implementation, and
the citizens for information.' 36 The only way in which the EU may force a
member state to fulfill its implementation obligations is set forth in Article
169:
If the Commission considers that a Member State has failed
to fulfill any of its obligations under this Treaty, it shall
give a reasoned opinion on the matter after requiring such
State to submit its comments. If the State does not comply
with the terms of such opinion within the period laid down

131

SEA, supra note 33.

132 Id.
133 Robert F. Meagher, EC Environmental Law, in TRANSNATIONAL LAW AND ITS
IMPACT ON CORPORATE BEHAVIOR, supra note 3, at 151, 167-68.

134 Strubel, supra note 99, at 240.
135 Id.
136 Meagher, supra note 133, at 151.
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the latter may bring the matter to the
by the Commission,
37
Justice.1
of
Court
If the ECJ finds for the Commission, it may impose a duty upon a
member state to take remedial measures, or require alteration of a state
statute that conflicts with a regulation.' 38 Most member states rarely wish
to let the matter continue to that point as is evidenced by the 1992
statistics. Out of the 143 Article 169 warning letters sent out by the
Commission, only twenty-six of those had to be followed with reasoned
opinions, and only nine of those had to be taken before the ECJ. 13 9 Of the
few states that do push the issue to that point, most shape up fairly
quickly. Indeed, it is rare when the Commission has to fine a state more
than once, if at all, to ensure compliance with an ECJ judgment.140 The
Commission has neither the time nor personnel to allocate to searching out
violations, and this inadequacy, combined with the lengthy process, which
cases take over four years, constitutes an implementation
can in extreme
4'
problem.'
Even if the notion that a faultily implemented higher standard is
better than none is an unacceptable one, there is some evidence to indicate
that implementation is beginning to be enforced by another means. 142 Any
EU citizen may bring a complaint to the Commission if he or she feels that
a member state is not fulfilling its EU obligations, and more and more
citizens are availing themselves of this advantage.' 43 For example, in
1975, the EU set environmental standards for any waters that were
frequently used for swimming. 44 The United Kingdom managed to avoid
a great deal of the effect of these standards for some time, by construing
the definition of the bodies of water involved so narrowly that only
twenty-seven bodies of water were regulated. 45 At last count this number
had risen to 400, due to the fact that British citizens knew of the directive
and their right to complain to the Commission, and they did in fact
137 EEC Treaty, supra note 14, at art. 169.
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complain to the Commission, as well as to British newspapers with great
vim and vigor until the combination of Commission and public pressure
forced the British government to come to a more accurate understanding
of its obligation. 146 It is not only citizens who have a history of familiarity
with environmental rights or are used to the complaint system that turn
this option to advantage. To the surprise of many observers, a large
number of citizen environmental complaints come from Spain, a country
that is generally viewed as giving the environment a low priority, and a
country that does not typically contribute so greatly to the number of
Commission complaints.
This illustrates that information about EU
environmental rights does reach the citizens of the less environmentally
inclined countries, and that the citizens do feel as though the complaint
system and its attendant pressure of public opinion provide a remedy for
inadequate implementation that slips past the Commission's attention.
Concerns have been expressed as to whether the expansion of the
EU could be harmed by the requirement that incoming members be
prepared to meet common EU environmental standards, given the
environmental problems that some Central and Eastern European ("CEE")
countries have. As differing environmental standards can and do cause
trade and competition barriers, harm to expansion would probably have to
occur if potential members could not or would not meet the EU's
environmental requirements. Fortunately, to date, there has been little
sign that CEE countries wish to make the environmental issue a firm
sticking point.148 Most CEE countries realize that their environments
needs help, and some even make it a primary issue. For example, at one
time the Czech government requested that ninety percent of its EU
financial aid be earmarked towards environmental rehabilitation and
harmonization. 14 9 It is, however, perfectly permissibly if CEEs do not
wish to make the environment their primary focus. The White Paper on
entrance into the EU expressly allows CEEs to set their own order of
priorities and timetable for a realistic entrance. 50 If a CEE feels that
another area should be remedied ahead of its environment during the quest
for accession to the EU, it is free to pursue harmonization in that order, so
146lId.
147
148

Brusasco-Mackenzie, supra note 3, at 178.
Jurg Klarer & Patrick Francis, The European Dimension: Towards
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long as harmonization occurs before entry into and unstabilization of the
equal costs of production and goods entry of the EU.15 1 Furthermore, if
CEEs feel overwhelmed by the complexity of the environmental task,
Poland and Hungary Assistance for the Reconstruction of the Economy
("PHARE"), is available to all CEEs to provide both financial and
technical support. 52 In fact, PHARE has a department that does nothing
but provide specialized technical advice and cost-benefit analysis in this
area. In addition, the department spends nearly ten percent of its funding
budget on CEE environmental projects, as well as an additional fourteen
percent on infrastructure, and sixteen percent on public education and
health, both of which often contain environmental overlap, 5 3 and as
PHARE becomes more experienced in the kinds of environmental issues
facing CEEs, its assistance becomes even more valuable. 54 For these
reasons, it appears as though concern in this area is premature.
The above examples seem to suggest that the EU has found ways
to adequately address any problems that might affect it on an internal level
when trying to use a common environmental standard for both the
purposes of free trade and the environment. Member states do not only
trade with each other.
Concerns exist that the EU will use its
environmental standard to erect protectionist, non-tariff barriers against
non-EU countries, thus damaging trade in the broader international sense,
in a manner
similar and familiar to anyone who was a stockholder in
151

Chiquita.

There is some validity to this concern. For example, the EU
decided to impose restrictions upon its import and export of ozone
depleting substances to a point beyond that required by the Montreal
Protocol.15 6 As a result, countries that used to export ozone producing
substances into the EU, such as the United States and Israel in the case of
methyl bromide, are going to suffer from a reduction in trade of that
good. 57 Similarly, arguments were made by OPEC countries with respect
to the proposed energy tax, claiming that the energy tax was really a
method of protecting EU energy producers from foreign competition.58 It
151 Id.at4.

152 Klarer & Francis, supra note 148, at 37-38.
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must be pointed out that the EU is applying these provisions to all
countries in a non-discriminatory manner, including its own, and that
therefore other countries should be able to balance the decrease in methyl
bromide or oil trade by an increase in trade in their substitutes. However,
other measures appear to be more discriminatorily motivated. For
example, the EU and Brazil entered into a huge disagreement over
whether the EU could only award an eco-label to paper produced from
recycled pulp (common in Europe), as opposed to paper made from virgin
pulp from sustainably managed forests (common in many countries
elsewhere). In the end Brazil was forced to back down due to the
voluntary nature of the EU eco-label program. 159 Does the EU have any

sort of justification for the potential negative effect on broader

international trade?
The World Trade Organization ("WTO") sometimes perceives the
EU as unjustified in creating this sort of situation. One of the most recent
examples of the conflict that the EU has had in attempting to justify its
environmental stance before the WTO involves the issue of hormone
treated beef. The EU has decided to ban the use of hormone treated beef
due to fears that it could have a deleterious effect on human health.' .60
Although there is no scientific evidence to suggest that hormone treated
beef is in fact a danger to human health, the EU's health and
environmental policies require that the EU take preventative steps to deal
with problems whenever possible, rather than waiting to see if a problem
develops and then dealing with it after the fact. 161 However, when the
United States claimed that the EU was violating its General Agreement of
Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") obligations by banning the import of
hormone treated beef, 162 the WTO agreed. 163 Although the GATT does

allow for exceptions from its main provisions on the grounds of human,
animal, or plant life, 164 the WTO held that the EU's ban on hormone
treated beef did not qualify for the exception, since there was no scientific

Lind, supra note 64, at 138-40.
Leticia M. Diaz, Hormone Replacement Therapy, or Just Eat More Meat: The
TechnologicalHare or the Regulatory Tortoise, 27 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 391, 39697 (2000).
161 George H. Rountree, Note, Raging Hormones: A Discussion of the World Trade
Organization'sDecision in the European Union-UnitedStates Beef Disputes, 27 GA. J.
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evidence that the ban was necessary for preserving human, animal, or
plant life. 165 Therefore, the WTO found that the United States would be
permitted to increase tariffs on other, unrelated items that it imported from
the EU if the EU refused to66lift its ban on hormone treated beef (which to
date the EU has not done).'
Was the WTO correct in holding that the EU should only be
allowed to have a high environmental standard in situations widely
recognized (and therefore probably also highly regulated in other
industrial countries) as harmful, in order to prevent the development of
trade barriers that might or might not be truly environmentally motivated?
Admittedly, that is the very reason why the EU began to have a common
environmental policy. 167 Although the EU decided to eliminate potential
trade barriers in disguise by having the common environmental policy, the
EU and its member states also remained committed to raising that standard
to a high level.' 68 This demonstrates that in this sort of situation, the trade
problem is caused by unevenness in environmental protection levels, not
by the high (or low) levels themselves. This leaves the EU with two main
choices that should have an equal effect on this kind of disruption of
trade. 69 The EU can either lower its standards until they are equivalent to
those of other countries, or it can use its influence, stronger than the
influence that any one of its members would have, since it represents the
common position of all its members, to bring other countries up to its own
high standards.170 Given these two options it might be difficult to fault the
EU for attempting to improve the environment of others instead of
degrading its own.
V.

CONCLUSION
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In conclusion, it seems apparent that disregard for the differences
between environmental standards can cause severe problems in the free
flow of trade and equal, efficient competition, and that the heightening of
such standards to a higher common level may be done without causing as
much damage to industry as might have been previously thought. The EU
and its members deserve commendation for having realized these essential
truths early on in the rush toward a more global market and for setting
about these common environmental standards in a positive, balanced way.
It is to be hoped that the presence of the EU on the broader international
scene will inspire other states to integrate something similar to the EU
environmental system into their own multilateral treaties.

